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If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.
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ABSTRACT
General relativity poses serious problems for counterfactual propositions peculiar to it as
a physical theory, problems that have gone unremarked on in the physics and in the phi-
losophy literature. Because these problems arise from the dynamical nature of spacetime
geometry, they are shared by all schools of thought on how counterfactuals should be
interpreted and understood. Given the role of counterfactuals in the characterization of,
inter alia, many accounts of scientific laws, theory-confirmation and causation, general
relativity once again presents us with idiosyncratic puzzles any attempt to analyze and
understand the nature of scientific knowledge and of science itself must face.
In his elegant, magisterial exposition of the foundations of general relativity, Malament (2012,
ch. 2, §1, pp. 120–121) provides three interpretive principles to endow the mathematical framework
of Lorentzian geometry with physical content:1
For all smooth curves γ : I →M [where I ⊂ R is an open interval and M is a candidate
spacetime manifold]:
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1I follow Malament (2012) in all relevant conventions (the signature of the spacetime metric, the definition of the
Weyl tensor, etc.). The reader should consult that work or Wald (1984) for exposition of all concepts and results
about general relativity I rely on in this paper.
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(C1) γ is timelike iff γ[I] could be the worldline of a point particle with positive mass;
(C2) γ can be reparametrized so as to be a null geodesic iff γ[I] could be the trajectory
of a light ray;
(P1) γ can be reparametrized so as to be a timelike geodesic iff γ[I] could be the
worldline of a free point particle with positive mass.
(Emphases are Malament’s; ‘C’ indicates the proposition pertains to the interpretation of conformal
structure, ‘P’ to projective structure.) He immediately offers four comments and qualifications to
address possible concerns one may have with these propositions as interpretative principles, touching
on questions about the exclusion of tachyons, the restriction to smooth curves, the status of point
particles in general relativity, and, of most interest for our purposes, the modal character of the
propositions. He concludes (ibid., p. 122),
Though these four concerns are important and raise interesting questions about the role
of idealization and modality in the formulation of physical theory, they have little to do
with relativity theory as such.
I agree with his conclusion in all parts, except for the concern about the role of modality. I think there
are important problems with modality in general, and with the understanding of counterfactuals in
particular, peculiar to general relativity as a physical theory, problems, moreover, that have gone
unremarked in the philosophy and the physics literature. Malament’s formulation and discussion of
the interpretative principles allows them to be drawn out with great clarity.2
About (C2) he says (loc. cit.), “We are considering what trajectories are available to light rays
when no intervening material media are present—i.e., when we are dealing with light rays in vacuo.”
Now, surely we want to talk as well about the null cones even at those places where matter is present.
In order to do so, and in order to formulate the analogue of (C2) for those spacetime regions (in
order to give a physical interpretation to the null cones at those points), we must say something
along the following lines: the null geodesics where matter is present are those paths light rays would
follow if the matter there were removed. But on its face, that modal statement makes no sense in
the context of general relativity, because however we make sense of the idea of “removing matter”
from a spacetime region, the metric will eo ipso be different in that region from what it was, and it
will generically be the case that the new metric in that region will not agree with the original metric
on what it counts as null vectors, among many other differences.3 The distribution of matter in a
region of spacetime in large part informs the metrical structure there, so what sense can be made,
in the context of the theory, in asking what the metrical structure would be if the matter actually
there were not there? And now we face the heart of the problem: the ineliminable ambiguity in the
2I want to emphasize that I am not criticizing Malament or trying to draw attention to weaknesses or errors in
his exposition, quite the contrary. It is the exemplary (and characteristic) clarity, precision and thoroughness of his
discussion that allows a previously unacknowledged problem to be brought into the light.
3The same problem arises for timelike curves in regions of spacetime already occupied by matter, i.e., for (C1) and
(P1), but I will focus on the case of null rays to simplify the exposition.
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idea of what it may mean to “remove matter from a region of spacetime” guarantees that we have
no way to conclude on any principled basis “what the metric would then look like there”.
The problem is made more acute by the fact that metrical curvature is only in part informed
by the distribution of matter: the Weyl curvature at a point, exactly that part of the curvature
encoding conformal information, such as what counts as a null vector, is independent of the value
of the stress-energy tensor at that point—the value of the Weyl tensor, point by point, is not
constrained by the presence or absence of matter. In regions without matter, moreover, metrical
curvature is governed entirely by the Weyl tensor. Still, the Weyl tensor Cabcd is subtlely related to
the distribution of matter at neighboring points, when there is such matter, in a way that can be
made precise by using the Bianchi identity formulated using the so-called Lanczos tensor.4 Thus, in
“removing matter” from a spacetime region, there can be no principled way to determine what the
“remaining curvature” will be. One may decide to keep the Weyl tensor the same. But precisely its
relation to stress-energy by way of the Lanczos tensor means that this is not an unproblematic way
to proceed, and is likely even incoherent or inconsistent.5
To make the problem a little more concrete, consider the following situation: one has a solid
translucent medium of a fixed shape and material constitution, and one wants to know “the path a
light ray would take if one drilled a narrow cylindrical hole through the middle and pointed a laser
through it”. There are (at least) two obvious ways of preceding. First, one can look for a static
solution for such an object (i.e., a solution for such an object “existing in isolation for all time”),
and then solve, for some fixed interval of “time”, for the null geodesics that thread the 4-cylinder
formed by the opening. Second, one can model the process of drilling the hole in the initially solid
object, and similarly solve for the relevant null geodesics (at a region far enough to the future of the
drilling process to ensure that all gravitational excitations induced by the drilling have had time to
radiate away, etc.). In general, there is no reason why the two modeling procedures will yield the
same answers to any questions one may want to pose about the null geodesics threading the opening.
(One must be careful here: since one is dealing with two different spacetimes, one cannot simply
“compare the null geodesics yielded by each procedure”, and, indeed, the kinds of question one will
be able to ask so as to be able to sensibly compare answers the two procedures give is limited.) And
there is no principled reason to prefer one of the procedures to the other.
4The Lanczos tensor is defined as follows:
Jabc :=
1
2
∇[bRa]c +
1
6
gc[a∇b]R
= 4pi∇[bTa]c −
1
12
gc[b∇a]T
(0.1)
then the Bianchi identity may be rewritten
∇nCnabc = Jabc
Thus the value of the Weyl tensor at a point does depend in an indirect way on the distribution of matter at nearby
points.
5It should therefore be clear that these sorts of problem arise not only for counterfactuals involving changes in the
distribution of matter, but also for any involving changes in the curvature more generally. One may, for example,
try to consider how the behavior of test-particles in a vacuum spacetime would change if one were to “remove a
component of the ambient gravitational radiation”.
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It follows that there is no single algorithm or reasoning procedure to employ for all such possi-
ble cases of proposed counterfactual reasoning in general relativity. One will have to handle such
situations on a case-by-case basis, coming up with a method to fix the metrical structure in the
proposed counterfactual situation in some way that respects the particular constraints of the project
the counterfactual reasoning is to play a part in.
Compare the situation in Newtonian gravitational theory. It makes perfect sense in Newtonian
theory to reason counterfactually about the behavior of a given kind of system in the presence or
absence of any other kind of system, since that presence or absence won’t affect the kinematical
structure of Newtonian spacetime. There is, for example, no problem in principle in computing
the counterfactual change in gravitational forces in a region induced by any counterfactual changes
in the distribution of matter anywhere in the spacetime. But one just cannot do that in general
relativity, unless one spells out what the new metrical structure will be in advance when one tries to
reason counterfactually about what would happen if one were to “change the distribution of matter
in a region of spacetime”.
It is important to note, nevertheless, that there is at least one kind of counterfactual in the
context of general relativity that does not face these sorts of problems: those that do not involve
counterfactual changes to the distribution of matter or the structure of curvature more generally.
As Malament himself notes (ibid., p. 121, his emphases), “It is simply not true—take the case of
(C1)—that all images of smooth, timelike curves are, in fact, the worldlines of massive particles. The
claim is that, as least so far as the laws of relativity theory are concerned, they could be.” One way
to make such a modal claim precise is to invoke the notion of a test-particle, i.e., by assuming that
the particle is so small and has so little stress-energy that it is an excellent approximation to ignore
any contribution it could make to the stress-energy tensor, leaving the metric unchanged along the
path at issue.
The problem I expose in this paper is severe: many influential philosophical approaches to many
fundamental problems and issues in the philosophy of science—the nature of scientific laws, of
theory-confirmation, of causation, et al.— rely, in ineliminable ways, on subjunctive conditionals for
their formulation and application. Physicists certainly rely on such propositions in theoretical and
experimental practice to propose and perform tests of general relativity. What reason do we have
to believe that we understand what is happening in such cases in the context of general relativity,
much less to have confidence in any conclusions drawn? Indeed, I think the situation is even worse
than the preceding remarks suggest. Because the problem arises solely from the dynamical nature
of spacetime geometry in general relativity, what I say here is wholly independent of one’s favorite
account of counterfactuals—it depends only on the theoretical resources general relativity provides
to model such situations and pose such propositions, no matter what ancillary tools or frameworks
one uses to interpret and understand them.
I wanted in this paper only to draw attention to this serious problem, not to propose possible
solutions. I think any decent attempt to do the latter will require a great deal of involved, technical
work, including detailed examination of many non-trivial examples. I sincerely hope someone takes
up the challenge. The mettle of philosophy and the needs of physics demand we understand what
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is going on here.
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